The ICC will gain the capacity to prosecute the crime of aggression in 2017. The Amendments to the Rome Statute are the product of a political compromise and have a complex legal structure with a high definitional threshold for an act of aggression alongside a bespoke jurisdictional arrangement. This legal structure is likely to mean that very few acts of aggression are considered crimes. Even when acts of aggression pass the threshold set out in the amendments, it is highly likely that any such prosecution would not succeed. This paper argues that this is likely to significantly impact the legitimacy of the ICC as an organization. To understand this, it is necessary to look at the different meanings of legitimacy before examining how the way in which the law is configured could undermine the political legitimacy of the organization as a whole.
Introduction
In 2017, the Kampala amendments to the Rome Statute will come into force, giving the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. On the face of it, this seems a logical step in the ICC's development, as whilst it can currently prosecute crimes perpetrated during wars, it lacks the power to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for starting conflicts. The ICC's exercise of jurisdiction in Africa, in particular in Sudan, Libya, and Kenya, has caused significant controversy and whilst part of this hostility is the result of political double standards on the part of some states, it has had a wider impact on the legitimacy of the court as an institution. 1 The ability of the court to prosecute the causes of the conflict could contribute to addressing these legitimacy problems, existing problems of legitimacy will be actively worsened by ICC's acquisition of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
This is due to the structure of the law itself which defines the new crime in a manner which significantly limits the types of action that may be classed as aggression and has a jurisdictional regime even more restrictive than the Rome Statute currently has. The Kampala
Amendments will severely limit the number of actual instances of armed intervention the court is able to prosecute and it is quite possible that the ICC will not be able to bring a successful prosecution for the crime of aggression at all. Recent scholarship has identified a link between the pragmatic legitimacy of the ICC, that is its ability to relate to stakeholders and appear legitimate in their eyes, and its overall legitimacy as an organization. 6 This link is likely to be severed as the ICC will gain jurisdiction over the crime of aggression but be practically unable to utilise this newly acquired power, calling the wider authority of the organization into question and contributing to existing concerns about the court's lack of legitimacy.
The first part of this article analyses the nature of the ICC's legitimacy as an organization and how the assumption of the responsibility for the crime of aggression changes it. In this context, it becomes important to distinguish between the original legitimacy of an organization, which relates to a normative claim to legitimacy, and its functional legitimacy, which concerns the institutional ability produce results. With respect to the crime of aggression, the latter form of legitimacy is likely to affect the former, as the failure of the ICC to successfully prosecute acts of aggression will weaken the legitimacy of the organization as a whole. The reasons for this are explored in the second and third sections of this article, which analyses the structure of the Kampala Amendments. In section two, the definition of the crime of aggression under the Amendments is unpacked to show just how limited a definition of aggression they contain. Within this narrow definition, however, one act of aggression which could be prosecuted is illegal humanitarian intervention. Yet, as the third section demonstrates, due to the jurisdictional provisions of the Amendments and the procedural regime at the ICC, it is highly unlikely that a successful prosecution will take place in such circumstances.
The Legitimacy of the ICC and the Crime of Aggression
The concept of legitimacy, David Hurd argues, is the 'normative belief by an actor that a rule of institution ought to be obeyed.' 7 It is important to emphasise the 'ought' in this statement, as this is not a description of an empirical condition of compliance or obedience. Rather, it is a description of a type of belief in a source of authority that an actor may hold. 8 International institutions do not have coercive powers in the same way that domestic institutions are able to compel compliance. In any event, as scholars have pointed out, coercing individuals into obedience is distinct from the normative belief that such obedience ought to happen. 9 In the international system, as Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope argue, legitimacy is best understood as the capacity of an institution or legal regime 'to generate fidelity to the rule of law itself'. 10 This does not mean that there will be universal compliance with the law but does mean that there is a shared understanding that a particular institution issues decisions that are fair and ought to be followed. This is the broad definition of the word legitimacy adopted in this article.
However, this does not say much about how legitimacy is generated. Thomas Franck's view was that legitimacy in international law is created by the perception that rules were constructed 'fairly' by a transparent system. 11 This, as Brunnée and Toope point out, is a highly positivist conception of how legitimacy comes into being, and, they argue, that legitimacy is constructed by the interaction of actors in the international system. 12 It is the latter view of legitimacy's origin that is taken in this article, since this appears to be the case in relation to the ICC. The Rome Statute has 124 state parties making the ICC, from a positivist perspective, a legitimate actor, but as shown below, the ICC's actions as a political agent have gradually destabilized its authority as an organization. To understand the legitimacy of the ICC, it is necessary firstly to unpack the different types of legitimacy,
before looking at what changes may occur after the court assumes jurisdiction for the crime of aggression.
Original and Functional Legitimacy
It is important to distinguish between normative legitimacy, whether an institution has a right to rule in a moral or philosophical sense, and descriptive legitimacy, whether as a matter of fact it enjoys 'a reservoir of support that makes people willing to defer' to the institution even when it issues 'unpopular decisions.' 13 The institutional authority which enables an organization to deliver judgments that are regarded authoritative irrespective of their content, South Africa and other states. In these cases, the criticism of the ICC has revolved around problems of functional legitimacy -Deputy South African President Cyril Ramaphosa described South Africa's withdrawal as a 'critique of the manner in which the institution has functioned.' 19 However, this has the effect of undermining elements of the original legitimacy of the ICC, in particular the idea that the court is an institution that can promote universal justice.
The original legitimacy of the ICC
The debates on the ICC's original legitimacy are best understood by acknowledging that the court is caught between two different conceptions of its institutional role. Firstly, there is the 'court of last resort argument'. Cherif Bassiouni argues that the ICC was 'never intended to be a supra-national legal institution' and that its purpose was to act as some form of juridical 'safety net' which, under the terms of the Rome Statute, would complement national and regional jurisdictions. 20 This interpretation holds that the ICC's original legitimacy is largely based on the notion of state consent, although consenting to join an organization does not automatically make it legitimate. 21 It also ignores the difficult balancing act that being a court of last resort entails. As Thomas Hansen notes, the ICC has often experienced tensions between its 'universalist' mission and the necessity to engage in 'realpolitik' to build trust as an organization. 22 In general terms, consent based arguments for the legitimacy of the ICC do not fully account for the way that the court has evolved, nor does it address the differences among its various institutional bodies, such as the independent Office of the Prosecutor, which constitute an actor within the ICC system in its own right.
A second conception of the ICC's institutional identity is that it is a supranational organization designed to override national jurisdictions in order to protect fundamental human rights and safeguard the international community. aggression as the supreme crime since it 'contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole'. 30 This is based on the notion of projecting a form of public morality within the international order by locating and identifying individual enemies against the community.
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The other source of the crime of aggression origins lies in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which is aimed at prohibiting armed intervention against another state in order to maintain the international rule of law. As William Schabas notes, this is also reflected in the UN Declaration of Human Rights as well as in a number of other international instruments. 32 The specific internationally prohibited practice, considered jus cogens, is interference in another state using illegal force, and while some scholars have argued that this is a narrow or contradictory principle, the general rule of non-use of force has become a central component of the international legal order. 33 The General Assembly Resolution on Aggression follows this approach, describing aggression as 'a crime against international peace' which gives 'rise to international responsibility'. However, the Resolution does not spell out criminal sanctions nor does it create a regime of enforcement for the crime. 34 The main difference between this source and the criminalisation approach is that this focuses on strengthening existing institutions and the promotion of norm adherence, rather than on individual punishment for the act.
Normative expectations upon the assumptions of the crime of aggression
The ICC has acquired jurisdiction for a specific version of the crime of aggression defined by legitimacy of both the ICC as an organization and the crime of aggression as a concept in international law, the activation of jurisdiction over aggression tends to create normative expectations for the ICC, which will then have an effect on the court's original legitimacy.
Three factors can explain this process.
Firstly, the role of the ICC in enforcing the international rule of law, which falls under the second conception of the ICC's original legitimacy detailed in 2.2 of this paper, will be enhanced by its authority to adjudicate on issues of aggression. The court is now being expected to rule on the causes of armed conflict, giving it an greater role in the promotion of the international rule of law, one which international criminal law has been reluctant to undertake since the 1950s because of the political complexities involved in such cases. 35 As
McCabe notes, the evolution of the crime of aggression post 1945 has focused on 'political pariahs', which are often relatively 'soft' cases, politically speaking. 36 Although the fact that the jurisdictional regime under Article 15 bis of Amendments has the potential to exclude a large number of states was noticed in Kampala -as Japanese delegate claimed, the jurisdictional regime adopted 'unjustifiably solidifies blanket and automatic impunity of nationals of non-State Parties' to the amendments on the crime of aggression, 37 there is clearly expectation that the Amendments will improve the ICC's existing role in enforcing the rule of law -Ban Ki Moon, the then UN Secretary General, declared in a press release at the time that the crime of aggression in the ICC would strengthen the 'fight against legitimacy that is contingent on the court actually contributing to the process of peace-
making. The crucial element behind criminalization of conduct in International Criminal
Law, as Kai Ambos puts it, is the existence of a 'ius puniendi … the right or authority to punish' in law. 44 Thus, the entire process of criminalizing a practice presupposes punishment and the normative effects of punishment, such as deterrence. Indeed, there was a strong presumption during the process leading to the adoption of the Kampala Amendments that the ICC's ability to prosecute individuals for illegal war-making would, as Claus Kress notes, 'increase the pressure on state leaders to refrain from aggression'. 45 Clearly, such an authority can easily be considered an enhancement of the cosmopolitan justification for the ICC's original legitimacy.
The above considerations provide an outline of how the ICC's original legitimacy would be affected by the activation of its jurisdiction on the crime of aggression. However, as the next section shows, these normative expectations are likely to be frustrated by the structure of the law itself, thus creating a functional legitimacy problem for the ICC. Overall, the definition of the crime adopted in Kampala imposes a high threshold of illegality which will exclude military interventions falling within the grey zone that permeates the law on resort to force. As the law on the use of force as applied to state practice is ambiguous and the absence of express legality does not necessarily mean absolute illegality, most cases of inter-state violence will not qualify as crimes of aggression. Applying the Kampala Amendments to instances of past interventions reveal that the adopted definition of the crime of aggression is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive and, as such, it will be difficult for the ICC to exercise its new jurisdiction in a coherent manner, hence leading to wider legitimacy problems for the court. engage in armed action. 62 Thus, individuals in a leadership position who plan and conduct a Kosovo-style operation could be liable for the crime of aggression had they been aware of the conditions in which military action occurred, although, as the final section article demonstrates, there is every reason to believe that were prosecutions brought in these cases, they would be highly unlikely to succeed.
The Crime of Aggression under Article 8 bis

Military Interventions Likely to Qualify as Crimes of Aggression
Military Interventions that will Probably Not Qualify as Crimes of Aggression
Interventions pursuant to Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter enjoy concrete legal cover and will not be considered acts of aggression. The use of consent and self-defence based arguments to justify Western powers' use of armed drones against groups situated in the territory of other states also tests limits of legality, albeit not to the point of rendering these attacks crimes of aggression. While states' right of selfdefence, as traditionally understood, do not cover retaliations directed at non-state entities, the use of drone strikes as a response to terrorist threats amounts to pre-emptive self-defence, a sort of action whose legality is far from settled in international law. 69 Furthermore, when it comes to states consenting to allow other states to conduct drone strikes in their territory, 70 questions often arise as to the existence and validity of the agreement through which the host state approves another state's drone strikes in its territory. 71 The consent supposedly given by the governments of Pakistan and Yemen to US drone operations in their respective territories has been disputed by citizens and political groups within the two countries. 72 As cooperation with US-led drone programmes raises internal political difficulties in the host country, often consent is not registered in public records. 73 Hence, it is difficult to establish if the drones campaign in question complied with authority which was freely given by a responsible official of the country whose territory the terrorist group was located. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the legal case for drone strikes of the sort commonly used by Western powers in counterterrorism operations probably has sufficient backing so that it would not cross the manifest violation of the Charter threshold set out in the Amendments. Also in view of the 'character, gravity and scale' of contemporary drone warfare would be unlikely to qualify as individual strikes are sufficiently localised that they would not constitute aggression.
The Functional Legitimacy Issues Caused by the Narrowness of Article 8 bis.
Article 8 bis is extremely narrow and many instances of the use of force will fall outside the ICC's react for prosecution. and allows the ICC to assert its jurisdiction over a particular situation, a process designed to protect the interests of justice rather than directly overrule the national legal system. 
Prosecuting Cases of Humanitarian Intervention: The Functional Legitimacy problem in practice
The first part of this article explained the distinction between original legitimacy and functional legitimacy of international organizations and the relationship between these two forms of authority in the context of the ICC. It has been argued that there exists a real potential for problems in the functional legitimacy of the organization to undermine its original legitimacy as a whole. As the section above pointed out, the structure of the Kampala Amendments excludes far more situations of aggression than they include. This may well lead to a frustration of the normative expectations raised by the activation of the crime of aggression, which in turn can endanger the institutional legitimacy of the court entirely. The analysis thus far has focused on the substance of the law and what is eliminated from its scope but, as this section argues, there are strong reasons to believe that even if an act of aggression meets the requirements of Article 8 bis, it is highly unlikely that the ICC would be able to secure a conviction. Humanitarian intervention, which has received considerable attention from scholars and policy makers, provides a good case study to illustrate this problem, due to its contested status. Some of the points made below would apply to any prosecution of aggression, while some are specific to humanitarian intervention; in any case, they all serve to illustrate how Article 15 bis in tandem with procedural norms would cause a functional legitimacy crisis when prosecuting the crime of aggression. A chronological analysis of the procedural limitations and other legal factors surrounding the prosecution of the crime of aggression demonstrates that at every stage a prosecution of a humanitarian act of force is likely to fail, creating multiple and mutually distinct legitimacy problems for the ICC as an institution.
Bespoke Jurisdiction: Exacerbating the Problem of Double Standards
Article 15 bis allows state parties to the ICC to opt out from the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression, although non-state parties can still be referred by the Security Council for prosecution under Article 13 of the Rome Statute. 83 It is noteworthy that nothing in the to judicial review in pre-trial proceedings. In cases involving the crime of aggression, in both proprio motu cases and state referrals, if there has not been a determination by the Security
Council that an act of aggression has been committed, the pre-trial division must authorize the commencement of investigations. 94 This involves a panel of six judges assessing jurisdictional matters, the gravity of the crime and whether there are reasonable grounds to proceed. 95 In order to confirm the charges, the judges must be satisfied that the prosecution has established substantial grounds to demonstrate the accused has committed the offence. 96 In cases of illegal humanitarian intervention, the Prosecutor may decide that it is not in the interests of justice to prosecute a state leader for the crime of aggression on a number of different grounds, such as the erga omnes protection of basic human rights. 97 Equally, the pre-trial chamber may reject any such prosecution on legal grounds by arguing that, according to Understanding 6 of the Amendments, it is not clear that humanitarian intervention is an act of aggression. 98 Understanding 6 states that a determination of an act of aggression involves consideration 'of all the circumstances of each particular case, including … their consequences'. 99 While the language adopted does not expressly refer to purposes, a flexible interpretation of the provision may find that the reference to consequences opens the way for considering the motives behind the operation. 100 Admittedly, these tensions would not be alleviated if the court decides to prosecute the case.
Genuine humanitarian interventions are legitimated, in part, by the same universalist values that confer the court part of its legitimacy of origin. As such, it would be incoherent to indict a party for stopping an action that is per se criminalized in the Rome Statute. As noted in section two, a particular feature of the ICC is that the original legitimacy of the court also informs its functional legitimacy and hence prosecuting cases of illegal-but-legitimate uses of force could also have the effect of causing an institutional legitimacy crisis. This conundrum reflects the point that the crime of aggression has a distinct normative legitimacy from the one the ICC originally had, so when the protection of human rights conflicts with the promotion of order in international relations, the court cannot comply with the responsibility to defend both.
4.3
The Schachter's statement that, in relation to humanitarian intervention, it would be better to 'acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary and desirable in the particular circumstances' than it would be 'to adopt a principle that would open a wide gap in the barrier against unilateral use of force.' 115 The defence of necessity provides some resolution to the balancing conundrum outlined above -it allows the ICC to continue its stated cosmopolitan humanitarian aim whilst maintaining the prohibition against the use of force.
Strictly speaking allowing a defence of necessity does not render the underlying crime moot;
in municipal law murder is not considered decriminalised because the defence of necessity exists.
However, the flip side to this reasoning can be seen by analysing what the defence requires judges to do -namely make an assessment that the harm caused by illegal intervention was less than the harm that would have resulted from inaction. This would require the court to take into account not only the civilian deaths but also the infrastructure damage caused by war in the victim state. The necessity argument should also be treated with some suspicion even within the context of R2P. The UN Secretary General's report on R2P was highly sceptical of the necessity argument in humanitarian intervention, stating that it 'posed a false choice between two extremes: either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coercive military force to protect the vulnerable'. 118 Moreover, as Saira Mohamed argues in the context of the Libya intervention, necessity in the sense of preventing human rights abuses is often couched in terms of state interest of the intervening state, rather than an absolute duty to protect individuals. 119 Hence, the scope of the necessity defence would have to be wide enough to account for a range of political motivations. This points towards the central problem with the ICC accepting necessity as a defence -it involves making what amounts to an overtly political declaration that the court effectively endorses the reasoning of the state conducting the intervention. Considering that the international human rights regime as a whole is perceived by some states as a Trojan horse for the advancement of Western hegemony and both the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the ICC as an institution are common subjects of such criticism, the defence of necessity is likely to further exacerbate the legitimacy problems faced by the ICC.
Conclusion
Immi Tallgren described international criminal law as building a 'fortress of its own, with its own laws and policies', and in many respects, the Kampala Amendments follow this general trend. 121 Whilst offering a broadly coherent system of rules governing the substance of the criminal conduct of starting unlawful wars, the law to be adopted excludes many more potential instances of aggression than it includes. Moreover, the jurisdictional regime of the Kampala Amendments aggravates complicated double standards in the operation of the ICC by providing the opt-out option for the crime of aggression. These issues need to be seen in the general context of the ICC as an institution, which as Triestino Mariniello argues, has already 'unrealistic expectations' being placed upon it, in particular, the assumption that 'as a new civilizing institution' it provides a definitive 'cure for radical evil.' 122 As argued above, the functional legitimacy of the ICC is almost certainly going to be undermined when acts of aggression take place but the court is unable to act due to the structure of the law to be incorporated into the Rome Statute. The ICC's jurisdiction for the crime of aggression would rarely be, if ever, utilised, leaving the authority to punish perpetrators of the crime of aggression as a mostly exhortatory power. In addition, as the case study of humanitarian intervention suggests, even when a case does meet the requirements in Article 8 bis and
Article 15 bis, it is still possible that a conviction would not occur. Such an outcome would have the effect of signalling that the types of violations committed by states that are otherwise norm abiding (state parties to the ICC and the Amendments) but that at the same time are powerful (can conduct humanitarian intervention) are exculpated, feeding into the criticisms that some ICC state parties are effectively immune from accountability.
